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Abstract
In recent years prominent intellectuals have raised eth-
ical concerns about the consequences of artificial in-
telligence. One concern is that an autonomous agent
might modify itself to become ”superintelligent” and,
in supremely effective pursuit of poorly specified goals,
destroy all of humanity. This paper considers and re-
jects the possibility of this outcome. We argue that
this scenario depends on an agent’s ability to rapidly
improve its ability to predict its environment through
self-modification. Using a Bayesian model of a rea-
soning agent, we show that there are important limita-
tions to how an agent may improve its predictive abil-
ity through self-modification alone. We conclude that
concern about this artificial intelligence outcome is mis-
placed and better directed at policy questions around
data access and storage.
The appetite of the public and prominent intellectuals for the
study of the ethical implications of artificial intelligence has
increased in recent years. One captivating possibility is that
artificial intelligence research might result in a ‘superintelli-
gence’ that puts humanity at risk. (Russell 2014) has called
for AI researchers to consider this possibility seriously be-
cause, however unlikely, its mere possibility is grave.
(Bostrom 2014) argues for the importance of considering
the risks of artificial intelligence as a research agenda. For
Bostrom, the potential risks of artificial intelligence are not
just at the scale of industrial mishaps or weapons of mass de-
struction. Rather, Bostrom argues that artificial intelligence
has the potential to threaten humanity as a whole and deter-
mine the fate of the universe. We approach this grand thesis
with a measure of skepticism. Nevertheless, we hope that
by elucidating the argument and considering potential objec-
tions in good faith, we can get a better grip on the realistic
ethical implications of artificial intelligence.
This paper is in that spirit. We consider the argu-
ment for this AI doomsday scenario proposed by Bostrom
(Bostrom 2014). Section 1 summarizes Bostrom’s argument
and motivates the work of the rest of the paper. In focuses
on the conditions of an “intelligence explosion” that would
lead to a dominant machine intelligence averse to humanity.
Section 2 argues that rather than speculating broadly about
general artificial intelligence, we can predict outcomes of
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artificial intelligence by considering more narrowly a few
tasks that are essential to instrumental reasoning. Section
3 considers recalcitrance, the resistance of a system to im-
provements to its own intelligence, and the ways it can limit
intelligence explosion. Section 4 contains an analysis of the
recalcitrance of prediction, using a Bayesian model of a pre-
dictive agent. We conclude that prediction is not something
an agent can easily improve upon autonomously. Section 5
discusses the implication of these findings for further inves-
tigation into AI risk.
1 Bostrom’s core argument and definitions
Bostrom makes a number of claims in the course of his ar-
gument which I will outline here as distinct propositions.
Proposition 1. A system with sufficient intelligence relative
to other intelligent systems will have a ‘decisive strategic
advantage’ and will determine the fate of the world and uni-
verse.
Concretely, Bostrom accepts human beings, governments,
emulated brains, and computers as potential intelligent sys-
tems. In his implicit model of the world, these agents are
in contest with each other. By Bostrom’s definition, a ‘deci-
sive strategic advantage’ is the amount of technological ad-
vantage sufficient “to achieve complete world domination”.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the nuances
of Proposition 1. We will provisionally accept it and focus
on the probability that a sufficiently intelligent system will
arise.
Proposition 2. An intelligent system is likely to attain a de-
cisive strategic advantage if it undergoes an ‘intelligence ex-
plosion’, a rapidly accelerating rate of intelligence increase.
Bostrom never offers a definition of intelligence that is
amenable to quantification. He does leverage quantitative
intuitions in the course of his argument when he proposes
the following model of intelligence change.
Proposition 3. The rate of change in intelligence is equal to
optimization power divided by recalcitrance.
dI
dt
=
O
R
Optimization power refers to the effort of improving the in-
telligence of the system. Recalcitrance refers to the resis-
tance of the system to being improved.
Proposition 4. If an intelligent system works to improve its
own intelligence, then optimization power will increase with
the system’s intelligence, leading to rapidly accelerating in-
telligence increase if recalcitrance is sufficiently low.
We will consider more precise versions Proposition 2, 3,
and 4 latter in this paper.
Bostrom maintains that an intelligent system will attempt
to recursively improve its own intelligence under very gen-
eral conditions.
Proposition 5. Any intelligent system will have or develop
increasing its own intelligence as an instrumental goal to-
wards other goals.
Proposition 5 is a consequence of Bostrom’s instrumen-
tal convergence thesis, (Bostrom 2012)
Several instrumental values can be identified which
are convergent in the sense that their attainment would
increase the chances of the agent’s goal being realized
for a wide range of final goals and a wide range of situa-
tions, implying that these instrumental values are likely
to be pursued by a broad spectrum of situated intelli-
gent agents.
This thesis is important for Bostrom’s line of argument
because the threat of AI comes from its predictably rapid
takeoff as a ‘superintelligence’ combined with the unpre-
dictability of its goals.
Proposition 6. A machine intelligence is unlikely to have
goals that are aligned with the values of humans.
The developing field of value learning in artificial intel-
ligence (cite) has been motivated in part by concerns akin
to Proposition 6. In Bostrom’s work, the problems of ma-
chine value misalignment are illustrated by many dystopian
scenarios which we will not go into here.
Proposition 7. Recalcitrance is likely to be lower for ma-
chine intelligence than for human intelligence because of the
physical properties of computers.
The overall picture is a compelling narrative for many.
A machine intelligence research project achieves the abil-
ity to modify itself to make itself more intelligent. It does
so in service of some goal its programmers originally pro-
vided (Proposition 5). Since recalcitrance for improvements
to machine intelligence is low (Proposition 7), it undergoes
and intelligence explosion (Proposition 4), gets a decisive
strategic advantage (Proposition 2) and determines the fate
of humanity (Proposition 1). Since the machine’s goals are
likely misaligned with humanity’s (Proposition 6), artificial
intelligence poses a great risk.
Bostrom provides a wide survey of the possibilities sur-
rounding greater-than-human intelligence. We have outlined
the logic of the argument that we believe provides most of
the motivational force behind the book. In doing so, we have
made it easier to verify the logical validity of the argument.
We will continue to analyze this argument with a focus on
the role of instrumental goals and recalcitrance in predicting
artificial intelligence related risk. We will focus on Proposi-
tions 2, 3, 4, and 5, leaving other aspects of the argument to
future work.
2 Intelligence and instrumental tasks
The use of the term “intelligence” in the preceding section
has been vague. This is unfortunate and a consequence of
some of the vagueness in discussion of artificial intelligence
ethics and risk in Bostrom and elsewhere. Some of the dis-
course around the ethics of artificial intelligence anticipates
qualitatively new risks associated with what has been called
“Strong AI” (cite). One contribution of this paper is to nar-
row the discussion by showing that these risks can be under-
stood in terms of well-understood “narrow” AI tasks. We
anticipate that this narrower framing of the problems of AI
risk will be more tractable.
Bostrom leads with the provocative but fuzzy definition
of superintelligence as “any intellect that greatly exceeds the
cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of
interest. The logic of the argument shows that the “domains
of interest” necessary and sufficient for intelligence explo-
sion are limited to those that concern intelligence augmen-
tation itself.
Bostrom writes about these domains in two ways. In
one section he discusses the “cognitive superpowers”, do-
mains that would quicken a superintelligence takeoff. These
“superpowers” include: Intelligence amplification, Strate-
gizing, Social manipulation, Hacking, Technology research,
and Economic productivity. In another section he dis-
cusses “convergent instrumental values”, values that agents
with a broad variety of goals would converge on as im-
portant to their pursuit of final goals.. These values in-
clude: Self-preservation, Goal-content integrity, Cognitive
enhancement, Technological perfection, Resource acquisi-
tion.
There are striking parallels between the “superpowers”
that would hasten takeoff and instrumental values. “In-
telligence amplification” is a superpower, whereas ”cogni-
tive enhancement” is an instrumental value. “Technology
research” is a superpower, ”technological perfection” is a
value. The danger of intelligence explosion is the danger
that an intelligent system will confuse its power with its mo-
tives, in particular when its power and motive are both its
own intelligence in a narrow instrumental sense. We have
captured this aspect of Bostrom’s argument in Proposition
5, above.
We note that the motivation of a system to increase its
own instrumental intelligence is necessary but not sufficient
for an intelligence explosion. In addition to beingmotivated,
an intelligent system must be capable of rapidly increasing
its intelligence. By Proposition 4, this capability will be a
function not only of the system’s optimization power, but
also its recalcitrance.
The possibility of an intelligence explosion will be re-
stricted specifically by the recalcitrance of the kinds of tasks
that comprise instrumental intelligence. Narrowing our fo-
cus on specific tasks will make the problem of assessing AI
risk more tractable because performance on more narrowly
defined tasks is better specified. As a result, our judgements
about the recalcitrance of improvement on those tasks can
be better grounded in statistical and computer science the-
ory, as opposed to being speculative.
In pursuit of this more narrow and grounded understand-
ing of AI risk, in the next section we will explore Bostrom’s
model of intelligence growth in more depth.
3 Recalcitrance considered
Bostrom’s model of intelligence change depends on two
variables, optimization power and recalcitrance. These are
presented as components in a qualitative model. Optimiza-
tion power is the effort put into improving the intelligence
of the system. Recalcitrance is the resistance of the sys-
tem to improvement. While it’s desirable to have units in
which intelligence, optimization power, and recalcitrance
could be measured, none have been provided by Bostrom.
Nonetheless this model is a useful one for explicating intu-
itions about self-modifying intelligence.
Bostrom’s initial formulation of this model is:
dI
dt
=
O(I)
R
Bostrom’s claim is that for instrumental reasons an intel-
ligent system is likely to invest some portion of its intelli-
gence back into improving its intelligence. He introduces
a linear model of self-improvement that we will adapt here.
By assumption we can model O(I) = αI + β for some pa-
rameters α and β, where α and β are positive and represent
the contribution of optimization power by the system itself
and external forces (such as a team of researchers), respec-
tively. If recalcitrance is constant, e.g R = k, then we can
compute:
dI
dt
=
αI + β
k
Under these conditions, I will be exponentially increas-
ing in time t. This is the ”intelligence explosion” that gives
Bostrom’s argument so much momentum. The explosion
only gets worse if recalcitrance is below a constant. Implic-
itly, Bostrom appears committed to the following additional
proposition:
Proposition 8. A system whose intelligent is growing expo-
nentially is undergoing an intelligence explosion that will
lead to a decisive strategic advantage.
We provisionally accept this proposition. However, it’s
important to remember that recalcitrancemay also be a func-
tion of intelligence. Bostrom does not mention the possi-
bility of recalcitrance increasing in intelligence. Consider
the following model where recalcitrance is, like optimiza-
tion power, linearly increasing in intelligence.
dI
dt
=
αoI + βo
αrI + βr
Now there are four parameters instead of three. Note this
model is identical to the one above it when αr = 0. Assum-
ing all these parameters are positive, as I increases the rate
of intelligence growth approaches αo/αr from below. This
is linear, not exponential, growth. In this circumstance, there
would be no intelligence explosion and therefore much less
catastrophic AI risk.
There are many plausible reasons why recalcitrancemight
increase with intelligence levels. For example, if intelli-
gence improvements vary considerably in the search cost of
discovering them, then a system might first collect the “low
hanging fruit” and then have to resort to searching for harder
and harder to reach discoveries.
This is not a decisive argument against intelligence explo-
sion and the possibility of a decisively strategic intelligent
system. It is an argument for why considering recalcitrance
seriously is important for assessing the likelihood of such an
outcome. A firmer grip on the problem of predicting future
AI risk can be gained by looking at the recalcitrance of spe-
cific instrumental reasoning tasks. In the next section, we
consider specifically the recalcitrance of the general task of
prediction.
4 Recalcitrance of prediction
Prediction is a very well-studied problem in artificial intel-
ligence and statistics. Many more specific intelligence tasks
can be analyzed as special cases of prediction. For exam-
ple, some of Bostrom’s “cognitive superpowers”, such as
Hacking and Social Manipulation, are analysable partly as
a matter of prediction in the domains of computer networks
and interpersonal interaction. One reason why prediction is
so well-studied is that it is so important instrumentally: skill
at prediction is valuable in pursuit of a wide range of other
goals.
Prediction is such a critically important part of intelli-
gence that we propose the following conjecture as an ad-
dendum to Bostrom’s intelligence explosion argument:
Proposition 9. Part of what it means for an intelligent sys-
tem to improve its own intelligence in a domain (including
the domain of improving its own intelligence) is for it to im-
prove its ability to make predictions in that domain.
It follows that if the task of prediction is highly recalci-
trant, then there will be no autonomous intelligence explo-
sion.
A benefit of looking at a particular intelligent task is that it
allows us to think more concretely about what it would mean
to become more intelligent. For prediction, we can consider
intelligence to be the ability to make good predictions about
the world based on valid inference from data.
We will represent a predicting agent using the Bayesian
formulation of statistical inference:
P (H |D) =
P (D|H)P (H)
P (D)
Here, P (H |D) is the posterior probability of a hypothesis
H given observed data D. If one is following statistically
optimal procedure, one can compute this value by taking the
prior probability of the hypothesis P (H), multiplying it by
the likelihood of the data given the hypothesisP (D|H), and
then normalizing this result by dividing by the probability of
the data over all models, P (D) =
∑
i
P (D|Hi)P (Hi).
Statisticians will justifiably argue whether this is the best
formulation of prediction. And depending on the specifics
of the task, the target value may well be some function of
posterior (such as the hypothesis with maximum likelihood)
Factor Performance Bound Recalcitrance
Accuracy Perfect update ∞ at limit
Speed Hardware limit ∞ at limit
Prior True prior ∞, unalterable
Data No bound Unknown
Table 1: Summary of the four factors of prediction per-
formance of an artificially intelligent system, what bounds
them, and their effective recalcitrance to self-improvement.
and the overall distribution may be secondary. These are
valid objections that we would like to put to one side in order
to get across the intuition of an argument.
To the extent that the Bayesian formulation is an accurate
representation of the general problem of prediction, we can
analyze its recalcitrance. We start by enumerating the ways
in which an agent might improve its performance on the pre-
diction task, which is validly computing P (H |D) in such a
way that best approximates the truth.
• Computational accuracy. A system can improve its abil-
ity to compute the mathematical function of the Bayesian
update. Many widely used statistical inference algorithms
use numerical approximation rather and so it is possible
for a system to improve its algorithm’s faithfulness to the
mathematical formula that defines its goal.
• Computational speed. There are faster and slower ways
to compute the inference formula. An intelligent system
could come up with a way to make itself compute its an-
swer faster. This might be independent of the accuracy of
its answer.
• Prior. The success of inference depends crucially on the
prior probability assigned to hypotheses or models. A
prior is better when it assigns higher probability to the true
process that generates observable data, or models that are
‘close’ to that true process.
• Data. Assuming accurate Bayesian computation, perfor-
mance at prediction will depend on the quality of the data
used in the inference. Note that ”better data” is not neces-
sarily the same as “more data”. If the data that the system
learns from is from a biased sample of the phenomenon in
question, then a successful Bayesian update could make
its predictions worse, not better. Better data is data that is
informative with respect to the true process that generated
the data.
Now that we have enumerate the ways in which an intel-
ligent system may improve its power of prediction, we can
ask: how recalcitrant are these factors to self-improvement
by an intelligent system?
• Recalcitrance of accuracy. It may be possible for a
system to inspect itself and determine ways to modify
its own algorithm to make it more accurate at comput-
ing a Bayesian update. However there is a hard limit to
improvements of this kind. No system can compute a
Bayesian update more accurately than computing it per-
fectly accurately. Therefore, in the limit, recalcitrance of
computational accuracy is infinite.
• Recalcitrance of speed. It is possible for a system to ex-
periment with novel algorithms and select those that are
provably faster than its current ones, or which perform
better on benchmark tests. However, once again there is
a hard limit to the speed of computation: the maximum
speed of the hardware system on which the system is im-
plemented. Without the ability to increase hardware re-
sources available, an intelligent system will reach infinite
speed recalcitrance in the limit.
• Recalcitrance of the prior. An intelligent system could
modify the parameters of its expectations independently
of the data that it learns from. But it is essential to the
abstraction of the Bayesian agent that the prior encodes
whatever bias the agent has that is not learned from ex-
ternal data. So strictly speaking, there is no way for an
intelligent agent to modify its own prior intelligently. In-
telligence in prediction is a matter of using data intelli-
gently, not being accidentally gifted with the correct prior
beliefs. So the recalcitrance of improving the prior is in-
finite.
• Recalcitrance of data. Better data improves performance
on prediction. But data collection is not something an in-
telligent system can do purely autonomously, since it has
to interact with the phenomenon of interest to get more
data. We cannot make assumptions about the recalci-
trance of data collection without modeling the environ-
ment the agent is in.
Contrary to the conditions of Bostrom’s intelligence ex-
plosion scenario, we have identified ways in which the re-
calcitrance of prediction, an important instrumental reason-
ing task, is prohibitively high. Purely algorithmic self-
improvement is particularly limited. If we allow a system
to improve its own hardware, that allows the system to im-
prove its speed. Overall performance depends critically on
data collection. Neither hardware expansion nor data col-
lection is a feature of the intelligent system alone, but rather
the possibility of these depends on the context in which the
system operates. If, for example, there are increasing search
costs for the intelligent system as it seeks out new data and
hardware improvements, that would imply an increase in re-
calcitrance as a function of intelligence. As we have seen
in the previous section, this sort of dependence of recalci-
trance on intelligence can mean that the probability of an
intelligence explosion is negligible.
5 Discussion and directions for future work
We have explicated the logic of one argument for concern
about risk from artificial intelligence. This argument con-
cerns the possibility that an autonomous intelligent system
modifies itself, undergoes an intelligence explosion, and
takes over the world in a way that is adverse to human in-
terests.
In our analysis, we discover that at the core of the ar-
gument are several claims that are much more narrow and
tractable than appear on the surface. In particular, we can
get a grip on the problem of predicting the behavior of self-
modifying intelligent systems by focusing on instrumental
reasoning tasks and their susceptibility to autonomous self-
improvement. If we can show that recalcitrance on these
tasks is predictably high, we can dismiss the probability of
an intelligence explosion as being negligible.
To demonstrate how such an analysis could work, we
analyzed the recalcitrance of prediction, using a Bayesian
model of a predictive agent. We found that the barriers to
recursive self-improvement through algorithmic changes is
prohibitively high for an intelligence explosion. Rather, an
intelligent system attempting to improve its own abilities of
prediction would need foremost to acquire faster hardware
and better data.
The recalcitrance of acquiring faster hardware and bet-
ter data depend not just on the intelligence of the system,
but also on the environment. If an environment imposes
variable search and acquisition costs for hardware and data,
we would expect recalcitrance of these improvements to in-
crease with intelligence, which would curtail an intelligence
explosion.
While not a decisive argument against the possibility of
an intelligence explosion, the preceding arguments do sug-
gest that those concerned with the ethical implications of
the future of AI should put their attention elsewhere. If in-
telligent systems engage in intelligence-expanding activities
but in a non-explosive way, that suggests that the probably
outcomes for the future of AI will be best modelled as multi-
agent systems competing for cognitive resources rather than
as a single, decisively controlling agent.
If intelligence growth is limited by data and hardware,
not by advancement in artificial intelligence algorithms, that
also suggests that AI researchers may not be in the best po-
sition to mitigate the risks of artificial intelligence. Rather,
regulators controlling the use of generic computing hard-
ware and data storage may be more important to determin-
ing the future of artificial intelligence than those that design
algorithms.
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